
# A Technological Perspective on Misuse of Available Al

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## Introduction

Malicious misuse of civilian Al poses serious threats to security on a national and international level. Besides defining autonomous systems from a technological viewpoint, we show how already existing and openly available Al technology could be misused. We highlight the importance to discuss and mitigate threats from misused AI in order to ensure open civilian Al development in the future without unilateralism.

## What are Autonomous and Intelligent Systems?

#### **General terms**




Fig. 1: Overview of different terms in the field of Al

#### **Schematics of an Autonomous System**

It seems obvious to assume that autonomous systems based on Al are primarily defined by their algorithms. However, each system is a complex composition of input data, a predefined goal, the underlying code, and the Interface (both hardware or software) to interact with either the physical or digital world.




Fig. 2: Autonomous System

## Malicous Use

Misuse of Al: Misuse of Al is the use of Al for applications that were not intended originally.

Malicious use of Al: Malicious use of Al is the usage of Al technology to an end that threatens security.

Many innovations are based on misuse of open technology from a global community. In our work, we do not consider this benign misuse but explicitly focus on malicious misuse of civilian Al, because it threatens security and lacks attention in the current debate. Figure 3 visualizes the different modes of Al use, which define the scope of this paper.




Fig. 3: Schematic of Al modes of use with malicious misuse as scope of this work

## **Openness**

#### **Degrees of Openness**

Openness as a continuous scale: the level of openness can vary anywhere from a vague or abstract description to fully functional source code, trained models, detailed tutorials, files for 3D printing or full datasets. The usefulness of resources varies together with the openness level.




Fig. 4: Degrees of Openness for an Algorithm, taken from [2]

#### Platforms and Sources for Open Content

Large online platforms have been key for accessibility and usability of open resources. They provide content and also allow project management, collaboration and social interactions. Examples:

- SourceForge (sourceforge.net) and GitHub (github.com) for software
- Hackaday.io (hackaday.io) for hardware
- DBpedia (wiki.dbpedia.org) or Wikidata (www.wikidata.org) for data
- arXiv (arxiv.org) for scientific publications

#### **Openness and Al**

Al research and development is characterized by a high degree of openness, which enables widespread access, rapid diffusion and in the end an increasing development speed.

## **Threats**

Aside from "killer robots", autonomous weapons in virtual environments are similarly threatening security and probably more available than their hardware equivalents. The threats from malicious Al can be assigned to three categories[2]:

### **Digital Security**

- Elimination of trade-off between scale and efficacy of digital attacks
- Less labor intensive
- Autonomous systems as targets (vulnerabilities, data poisoning[1]

## **Political Security**

- Automation of surveillance
- Persuasion through propaganda and deception
- Media manipulation
- Classification capabilities of machine learning and analyze human behaviors, mood and beliefs



Fig. 5: Spear-Phishing

Fig. 6: Deepfake

### **Physical Security**

- (Lethal) **Autonomous** Weapon Systems
- Direct attacks AIby managed agents
- Subversion of cyber-physical systems (critical infrastructure)



Fig. 7: Swarming

## Implications of threats

#### **Expansion of existing threats**

#### Diffusion, efficiency, scalability of AI technology

- ⇒ Existing attacks become possible
- for more actors
- on a wider scale
- on more targets
- **⇒** Power shift: Governments to non-state actors

#### New attacks

Attacks that were impossible before, e.g. deepfakes

⇒ Threat of political security

#### **Changed character of attacks**

- Fine targeting
- Difficult attribution
- E.g. strategic swarm
- **⇒** Lower barrier for engaging in violence

## Prevention of malicious misuse

#### **Access Prevention through Points of Control**

Malicious misuse of Al can be prevented by restricting access to and diffusion of Al functions that can be misused in a malicious way. A threefold approach could be followed here: classify Al system components as critical, require registration and sub-sampling of components.

### **Attack prevention**

However, it is also important to **prevent attacks** of potentially malicious systems. This includes IT security and AI for attack prevention. Further, prohibition of functionalities and externally acessible emergency shutdowns can be imagined. The best attack prevention for digital security is clearly an informed society.

### Non-technical measures

A number of **non-technical measures** such as international and interdisciplinary discussion, the integration of a variety of actors, permanent committees and most important, collaboration between academia, private sectors, states and the civil society are of high importance.




Fig. 8: Proliferation Chain of Al

## References

[1] Blaine Nelson Battista Biggio and Pavel Laskov. Poisoning Attacks against Support Vector Machines. 2013. url: https://arxiv.org/ pdf/1206.6389.pdf.

[2] Miles Brundage et al. The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation. Tech. rep. 2018. arXiv: 1802. 07228. url: http://arxiv.org/abs/1802.07228.

